Abstract. The learning with rounding (LWR) problem, introduced by Banerjee, Peikert and Rosen [BPR12] at EUROCRYPT '12, is a variant of learning with errors (LWE), where one replaces random errors with deterministic rounding. The LWR problem was shown to be as hard as LWE for a setting of parameters where the modulus and modulus-to-error ratio are super-polynomial. In this work we resolve the main open problem of [BPR12] and give a new reduction that works for a larger range of parameters, allowing for a polynomial modulus and modulus-to-error ratio. In particular, a smaller modulus gives us greater efficiency, and a smaller modulus-to-error ratio gives us greater security, which now follows from the worst-case hardness of GapSVP with polynomial (rather than super-polynomial) approximation factors.
Introduction
Learning With Errors. The Learning with Errors (LWE) assumption states that "noisy" inner products of a secret vector with random public vectors, look pseudorandom. In the last years many cryptosystems have been constructed whose security can be proven under LWE, including (identity-based, leakage-resilient, fully homomorphic, functional) encryption [Reg05,GPV08,AGV09,LPR10,AFV11,BV11,LP11,GKP + 12], oblivious transfer [PVW08] , (blind) signatures [GPV08, Lyu09, Rüc10, Lyu12] , pseudo-random functions [BPR12] , hash functions [KV09, PR06] ,etc.
The LWE assumption, with parameters n, m, q ∈ N and a "small" error distribution χ over Z, states that for uniformly random A Sometimes it will be convenient to think of this distribution as consisting of m "LWE samples" of the form (a i , a i , s +e i ) ∈ Z n+1 q . One of the main advantages of the LWE problem is that, for some settings of parameters, we can prove its security under certain worst-case hardness assumptions over lattices; see [Reg05, Pei09] . One important parameter is the "size" of the error terms e $ ← χ which we denote by β. 5 As long as β exceeds some minimum threshold ≈ √ n, the concrete hardness of the LWE problem mainly depends on the dimension n and on the ratio of the modulus q to the error-size β. Therefore, we will often be unspecific about the exact distribution χ, and only focus on the error-size β.
Learning With Rounding. The Learning with Rounding (LWR) problem was introduced in [BPR12] . Instead of adding a random small error to various samples a, s ∈ Z q so as to hide their exact value, we release a deterministically rounded version of a, s . In particular, for some p < q, we divide up the elements of Z q into p contiguous intervals of roughly q/p elements each and define the rounding function · p : Z q → Z p that maps x ∈ Z q into the index of the interval that x belongs to. For example if q, p are both powers of 2, than this could correspond to outputting the log(p) most significant bits of x. We can extend the rounding function to vectors by applying it componentwise. The LWR assumption states that:
(A, A · s p ) is computationally indistinguishable from (A, u p ).
If p divides q, than u p is itself uniform over Z m p . The main advantage of LWR is that one does not need to sample any additional "errors", therefore requiring fewer random bits. The assumption has been used to construct simple and efficient pseudorandom generators and functions in [BPR12] , and deterministic encryption in [XXZ12] .
The work of [BPR12] shows a beautifully simple reduction proving the hardness of the LWR problem under the LWE assumption for some range of parameters. In particular, they observe that if the error size β is sufficiently small and the ratio q/p is sufficiently big, then a, s p = a, s + e p with overwhelming probability over random a $ ← Z q and e $ ← χ. In particular, the only way that the two values differ is if a, s ends up within a distance of |e| from a boundary between two different intervals; but since the intervals are of size q/p and the ball around the boundary is only of size 2|e| this is unlikely to happen when q/p is super-polynomially bigger than 2|e|. Therefore, one can show that:
where the first modification is statistically close and the second follows immediately from the hardness of LWE.
Unfortunately, the argument only goes through, when (q/p) is bigger than the error size β by a super-polynomial factor. In fact, if we want statistical distance 2 −λ we would need to set q ≥ 2 λ βp, where λ is a security parameter. This has three important consequences: (1) the modulus q has to be super-polynomial, which makes all of the computations less efficient, (2) the modulus-to-error ratio q/β is super-polynomial which makes the LWE problem easier and only gives us a reduction if we assume the hardness of the lattice problem GapSVP with super-polynomial approximation factors (a stronger assumption), (3) the ratio of the input-to-output modulus q/p is super-polynomial, meaning that we must "throw away" a lot of information when rounding and therefore get fewer bits of output per LWR sample. The work of [BPR12] conjectured that the LWR problem should be hard even for a polynomial modulus q, but left it as the main open problem to give a reduction.
The New Reduction and Properties of LWR
LWR with Polynomial Modulus. In this work, we resolve the open problem of [BPR12] and give a new reduction showing the hardness of LWR from that of LWE for a more general setting of parameters, including when the modulus q is only polynomial. In particular, instead of requiring q ≥ 2 λ βp, where λ is a security parameter as in [BPR12] , we only require q ≥ nmβp, where we recall that n is the dimension of the secret, and m is the number of LWR samples that we output, β is the size of the LWE errors, and p is the new modulus we round to. In particular, as long as the number of LWR samples m is fixed a-priori by some arbitrary polynomial, we can allow the modulus q to be polynomial. As mentioned, this setting provides greater efficiency (computation with smaller q) and greater security (smaller ratio q/β) allowing for a reduction from the worst-case hardness of the lattice problem GapSVP with polynomial approximation factors. In particular, the above efficiency and security improvements for LWR directly translate into improvements of the PRG and the basic synthesizer-based PRF constructions of [BPR12] (but not to their optimized "degree-k synthesizer" construction, which doesn't directly rely on LWR, and requires a superpolynomial modulus for different reasons).
To be even more precise, our reduction shows the hardness of LWR with parameters n, m, q, p assuming the hardness of LWE with parameters n , m, q, β (note: different dimension n vs. n) as long as:
for some flexible parameter γ ≥ 1. For example, setting γ = 1 allows for the smallest modulus q ≈ nmβp, but requires a larger dimension n ≈ n log(q) in the LWR problem than the dimension n of the underlying LWE assumption. On the other hand, setting γ = q δ for some constant δ ∈ (0, 1) gives a bigger polynomial modulus q ≈ (nmβp) 1/(1−δ) but allow us to set the LWR dimension n ≈ (1/δ)n = O(n ) to be closer to that of the underlying LWE assumption. Note that, for our reduction to work, the modulus q must always be sufficiently larger than the number of LWR samples m. Therefore, we can only set q to polynomial in a setting where the total number of samples m given out is known ahead of time. This is the case for all of the applications of [BPR12] as well as the new applications that we will describe in this work. In settings where m is not known ahead of time (e.g., the attacker can decide how many samples it will get) we would need to make the modulus q and the modulus-to-error ratio q/β super-polynomial, but our reduction still provides tighter exact security than that of [BPR12] . It remains as an interesting open problem to improve the parameters of the reduction further, and especially to remove the dependence between the modulus q and the number of LWR samples m that we give out.
LWR with Weak and Leaky Secrets. Another advantage of our reduction is that we prove the security of the LWR problem even when the secret s is not necessarily uniform over Z n q . Indeed, our proof also works when s is uniform over a smaller integer interval s $ ← {−γ, . . . , γ} n ⊆ Z n q , where the relation of γ ≥ 1 to the other parameters is given by equation (1). Moreover, our reduction works when the secret s is not even truly uniform over this interval (say, because the attacker observed some leakage on s, or s was sampled using a weak random source) as long as s retains some sufficiently high amount of min-entropy k ≈ n log(q), where n is the dimension of the underlying LWE assumption. Notice that, no matter how small the entropy k is, we can still prove security under some LWE assumption with correspondingly smaller dimension n .
The work of Goldwasser et al.
[GKPV10] shows similar results for the hardness of LWE with a weak and leaky secret, at least as long as the modulus q and the modulus-to-error ratio q/β are super-polynomial. Indeed, we will use a refinement of the technique from their work as the basis of our LWE to LWR reduction. Our refinement will also allow us to improve the parameters of [GKPV10], and show the hardness of LWE with a weak and leaky secret when the modulus q and the ratio q/β are polynomial.
The Reduction. As discussed above, the original reduction of [BPR12] required us to choose parameters so that rounded samples with and without error are almost always identical: Pr[ a, s p = a, s + e p ] ≤ negl. Therefore LWR outputs do not provide any more information than LWE outputs. In contrast, in our setting of parameters, when q is polynomial, there is a noticeable probability that the two values are different and therefore we will need a completely different proof strategy. Surprisingly, our strategy does not try to directly convert an LWE instance with a secret s into an LWR instance with secret s. Instead, we will rely on the LWE problem to change the distribution of the coefficient matrix A. In particular, we show that there is a "lossy" method of sampling a matrixÃ Before we describe how the Lossy() sampler works in the next paragraph, let us show that the above two properties allow us to prove the hardness of LWR problem. We can do so via a hybrid argument where, given many LWR samples, we replace one sample at a time from being an LWR sample to being uniformly random. In particular, assume we have m + 1 LWR samples and let the matrix A $ ← Z m×n q denote the coefficient vectors of the first m samples, and let a $ ← Z n q be the coefficient vector of the last sample. Then we can show:
In the first step, we use the LWE assumption to replace a uniformly random A by a lossy matrix A $ ← Lossy(), but still choose the last row a $ ← Z n q at random. In the second step, we use the fact that inner product is a strong extractor, where we think of the secret s as the source and the vector a as a seed. In particular, by the properties of the lossy sampler, we know that s maintains entropy conditioned on seeingÃ, Ã · s p and therefore the "extracted value" a, s is statistically close to a uniformly random and independent u $ ← Z q . In the last step, we simply replace the lossy matrixÃ $ ← Lossy() back by a uniformly random A. This shows that, given the first m LWR samples the last one looks uniform and independent. We can then repeat the above steps m more times to replace each of the remaining LWR samples (rows) by uniform, one-by-one.
The Lossy Sampler. The basic idea of our Lossy sampler is taken from the work of Goldwasser et al. [GKPV10] . We sample the lossy matrixÃ ∈ Z m×n q as
where n < n is some parameter and χ is a "small" LWE error distribution. We now need to show that this satisfies the properties (a) and (b) described above. It is easy to see thatÃ is computationally indistinguishable from a uniformly random matrix under the LWE assumption with parameters n , m, q, χ. In particular, each column i of the matrix A can be thought of as an LWE distribution B · c i + f i with coefficient matrix B, secret c i which is the ith column of the matrix C, and error vector f i which is the ith column of F. Therefore, using n hybrid arguments, we can replace each column i ofÃ by a uniformly random and independent one. This part of the argument is the same as in [GKPV10] .
Next, we need to show that the secret s retains entropy even conditioned on seeingÃ, Ã · s p . Let us first prove this property in the case when s $ ← {−1, 0, 1} n is itself a random "short" vector. 6 All of the information that we give out about s can be reconstructed from:
-The matrices B, C, F which defineÃ = BC + F and are independent of s on their own.
-The value C · s whose bit-length is n log(q).
The subscript i denotes the ith component of a vector.
Given the three pieces of information above, we can reconstructÃ, Ã · s p by setting (Ã · s) i p := (BC · s) i p for every index i not contained in Z, and setting (Ã · s) i p := v i for every i which is in Z. Therefore, we just need to show that the three pieces of information above do not reveal too much about s. First, we show that the set Z is small with overwhelming probability. In particular, an index i is contained in Z if and only if
Assume that the entries of the error matrix F are all bounded by β in absolute value with overwhelming probability, and therefore (F · s) i is bounded by nβ in absolute value. 7 Then the event (2) can only occur if the value (BC · s) i falls within distance nβ of a boundary between two different intervals. Since each interval is of size ≈ q/p and the ball around each boundary is of size 2nβ, this happens with (noticeable but small) probability ≤ 2nβp/q ≤ 1/m, when q ≥ 2nmβp (which gives us the bound of (1)). Therefore, the probability of any index i being in Z is at most 1/m, the expected size of Z is at most 1, and because these probabilities are independent, we can use Chernoff to bound |Z| ≤ n with overwhelming probability 1 − 2 −n . So in total, Z can be described by |Z|(log m + log p) ≤ n log q bits with overwhelming probability. Therefore, together, Z, Cs reveal only O(n log q) bits of information about s, even given B, C, F. We can summarize the above as:
Hence, if n is sufficiently larger than some O(n log q), the LWR secret maintains a large amount of entropy given the LWR samples with a lossyÃ. The above analysis also extends to the case where s is not uniformly random, but only has a sufficient amount of entropy.
We can also extend the above analysis to the case where s $ ← Z n q is uniformly random over the entire space (and not short), by thinking of s = s 1 + s 2 where s 1 $ ← Z n q is uniformly random and s 2 $ ← {−1, 0, 1} n is random and short. Using the same argument as above, we can show that, even given s 1 ,Ã and Ã · s p , the value s 2 (and therefore also s) maintains entropy.
Our analysis of lossiness as described above is inspired by [GKPV10] but differs from it significantly. In particular that work considered LWE (not LWR) samples with the matrixÃ, didn't explicitly analyze lossiness, and required super-polynomial modulus and modulus-to-error ratio. Indeed, we can use the ideas from the above analysis to also improve the parameters of that work, showing the robustness of the LWE problem to weak and leaky secrets for a polynomial modulus and modulus-to-error ratio. See Appendix B.
Applications
Reusable Computational Extractor. Recall that, by the leftover-hash lemma, the function Ext(s; a) := s, a is a good randomness extractor which can take any (secret) source s ∈ Z n q of sufficient min-entropy k ≥ log(q)+2 log(1/ε) and a random public seed a $ ← Z n q , and its output will be ε-close to uniformly random in Z q . But let's say we want to extract many different mutually (pseudo-)random values from the source s without keeping any long term state: each time we want to extract a new output we choose a fresh seed and apply the extractor. It's easy to see that the above inner-product extractor is completely insecure after at most n applications, and each successive output is easy to predict from the previous ones. The work of [DKL09] introduced the notion of a reusable computational extractor that remains secure even after m applications, where m can be an arbitrary polynomial, and gave a construction under a non-standard "learningsubspaces with noise" assumption. Our results immediately give us a new simple construction of reusable extractors defined by Ext(s; a) := a, s p . That is, we just round the output of the standard inner product extractor! We show that, as long as the LWE assumption holds with some parameters n , m, q, β, the source s is distributed over {0, 1} n and has entropy k ≥ O(n log(q)), and the modulus satisfies q ≥ 2βnmp, the above extractor is secure for m uses. In particular, we can have m n k.
Lossy Trapdoor Functions. Lossy trapdoor functions (LTDFs) [PW08, PW11] are a family of functions f pk (·) keyed by some public key pk, which can be sampled in one of two indistinguishable modes: injective and lossy. In the injective mode the function f pk (·) is an injective function and we can even sample pk along with a secret trapdoor key sk that allows us to invert it efficiently. In the lossy mode, the function f pk (·) is "many-to-one" and f pk (s) statistically loses information about the input s. LTDFs have many amazing applications in cryptography, such as allowing us to output many hardcore bits, construct CCA-2 public-key encryption [PW11, MY10] , and deterministic encryption [FOR12]. We construct very simple and efficient LTDFs using the LWR problem: the public key is a matrix pk = A and the function is defined as f A (s) = A · s p . We can sample an injective A with a trapdoor using the techniques of Ajtai [Ajt99] or subsequent improvements [AP11, MP12] , and one can sample a lossy A using our lossy sampler. Although prior constructions of LTDFs based on LWE are known [PW11, BKPW12] , our construction is extremely simple to describe and implement and has the advantage that our lossy mode loses "almost all" of the information contained in s. We also construct very simple and efficient "all-but-one" (ABO) lossy trapdoor functions based on LWR, which are useful for building efficient CCA-2 encryption.
is intended to guarantee security as long as the messages have sufficient entropy. Although there are black-box constructions of deterministic encryption using LTDFs [BFO08] , we get a very simple direct construction from the LWR problem: the public key is a matrix pk = A ∈ Z m×n q , and to encrypt a message s ∈ {0, 1} n , we simply output A · s p . We can sample A with a decryption trapdoor using the standard techniques [Ajt99,AP11,MP12] mentioned previously. Our analysis here is essentially the same as for our reusable extractor -we simply note that whenever s has sufficient entropy, the output A · s p is pseudorandom. We note that the same construction was proposed by Xie et al. [XXZ12] , but because the analysis there was similar to [BPR12, GKPV10] , they required a super-polynomial modulus and modulus-to-error ratio. The main advantage of this scheme over other deterministic encryption schemes is that we do not need any fixed threshold on the entropy of the message s: no matter how low it is we can still prove security under an LWE assumption with correspondingly degraded parameters.
Preliminaries
Notation. Throughout, we let λ denote the security parameter. We use bold lower-case letters (e.g., s, e) to denote vectors, and bold upper-case letters (e.g., A, B) to denote matrices. If X is a distribution or a random variable, we write x $ ← X to denote the process of sampling x according to X. If X is a set, we write x $ ← X to denote the process of sampling x uniformly at random over X. For two distribution ensembles
Bounded Distribution. For a distribution χ over the reals, and a bound β, we say that χ is β-bounded if the average absolute value of x $ ← χ is less then β, i.e., if E[|χ|] ≤ β.
Probabilistic Notions. We recap some definitions and results from probability theory.
Definition 2.1 (Statistical Distance). Let X, Y be random variables with supports S X , S Y , respectively. We define their statistical difference as ∆(X, Y ) =
We write X stat ≈ Y to denote that ∆(X, Y ) is negligible in the security parameter.
The min-entropy of a random variable X is
, and measures the "best guess" for X. The conditional min-entropy of X given Z, defined by Dodis et 
. This measures the "best guess" for X by an adversary that observes a correlated variable Z. That is, for all (potentially inefficient) functions A, we have Pr[A(Z) = X] ≤ 2 −H∞(X|Z) and there exists some A which achieves equality. The following lemma says that conditioning on bits of information, the min-entropy drops by at most bits.
Lemma 2.2 ([DORS08])
. Let X, Y, Z be arbitrary (correlated) random variables where the support of Z is of size at most 2 . Then
We will rely on the following definition of smooth min-entropy, which was first introduced by Renner and Wolf [RW04] . Intuitively, a random variable has high smooth min-entropy, if it is statistically close to a random variable with high min-entropy.
Definition 2.3 (Smooth Entropy).
We say that a random variable X has ε-smooth minentropy at least k, denoted by H ε ∞ (X) ≥ k, if there exists some variable X such that ∆(X, X ) ≤ ε and H ∞ (X ) ≥ k. Similarly, we say that the ε-smooth conditional min-entropy of X given
In the remainder of this paper, we will write H smooth ∞ (·) to denote H ε ∞ (·) for some (unspecified) negligible ε. We also prove a variant of Lemma 2.2 for smooth min entropy, which works when Z takes on at most 2 values with overwhelming probability.
Lemma 2.4. Let X, Y, Z be correlated random variables and Z be some set such that Pr[Z ∈ Z] ≥ 1 − ε and |Z| ≤ 2 . Then, for any
In other words the joint distribution of (X, Y, Z) is the same as (X, Y, f (X, Y )). Let g(z) be a function with range Z which outputs the input z if z ∈ Z and else outputs some fixed element
where the second inequality follows from Lemma 2.2.
We will use the following version of the Chernoff bound from [MU05] .
Lemma 2.5. Let X 1 , . . . , X n be independent Poisson trials, and let X = n i=1 X i and µ = E[X]. Then, for R ≥ 6µ, the following Chernoff bound holds: Pr[X ≥ R] ≤ 2 −R .
Learning with Errors and Learning with Rounding
Learning With Errors (LWE). The decisional learning with errors (LWE ) problem was first introduced by Regev [Reg05] . Informally, the problem asks to distinguish slightly perturbed random linear equations from truly random ones. (Since we will only talk about the decisional problem in this work, we will make this the default notion.) Definition 2.6 (LWE Assumption [Reg05] ). Let λ be the security parameter, n = n(λ), m = m(λ), q = q(λ) be integers and let χ = χ(λ) be a distribution over Z q . The LWE n,m,q,χ assumption says that, if we choose
← Z m q then the following distributions are computationally indistinguishable:
It has been shown that the LWE-assumption holds for certain error distributions χ, assuming the worst-case hardness of certain lattice problems. In particular, this is the case if χ is a discrete Gaussian distribution with appropriate variance, see, e.g., [Pei09, Reg05] for precise statements.
Learning with Rounding (LWR).
The learning with rounding (LWR) problem was introduced by Banerjee et al. [BPR12] . It can, in some sense, be seen as a de-randomized version of the LWE-problem. The idea is to compute the error terms deterministically: instead of perturbing the answer by adding a small error, we simply round the answer -in both cases we are intuitively hiding the low order bits.
More formally, the LWR-problem is defined via the following rounding function for integers q ≥ p ≥ 2:
where we naturally identify elements of Z k with the integers in the interval {0, . . . , k − 1}. 8 More intuitively, . p partitions Z q into intervals of length ≈ q p which it maps to the same image. We naturally extend the rounding function to vectors over Z q by applying it component-wise.
In the presentation of our results we will make use that the probability that a random element in Z q is close to a step in the rounding function is small. We therefore define, for any integer τ > 0:
We can easily bound the probability of a random element being on the border.
Lemma 2.7. We have |border p,q (τ )| ≤ 2τ p and therefore Pr
Proof. Let I = i∈{0,...,p−1} [i · q/p − τ , i · q/p + τ ) be a subset over the reals. It is easy to see that border p,q (τ ) = Z ∩ I and therefore |border p,q (τ )| ≤ 2τ p. The claim follows.
The learning with rounding problem is now defined as follows:
Definition 2.8 (LWR [BPR12] ). Let λ be the security parameter, n = n(λ), m = m(λ), q = q(λ), p = p(λ) be integers. The LWR n,m,q,p problem states that for
Notice that when p divides q, the distribution u p : u $ ← Z q is just the uniform over Z p . Otherwise, the distribution is slightly skewed with some values in Z p having probability q/p q and others q/p q . However, it is easy to deterministically extract random bits from such independent samples with an asymptotic rate of O(log(p)) bits per sample. Therefore, independent samples from the skewed distribution are often "good enough" in practice.
We also define a variant of the LWR assumption where the secret s can come from some weak source of entropy and the attacker may observe some partial leakage about s. Definition 2.9 (LWR with Weak and Leaky Secrets). Let λ be the security parameter and n, m, q, p be integer parameters as in Definition 2.8. Let γ = γ(λ) ∈ (0, q/2) be an integer and k = k(λ) be a real. The LWR WL(γ,k) n,m,q,p problem says that for any efficiently samplable correlated random variables (s, aux), where the support of s is the integer interval [−γ, γ] n and H ∞ (s|aux) ≥ k, the following distributions are computationally indistinguishable:
q are chosen randomly and independently of s, aux.
Lossy Mode for LWR
We now show that, under the LWE assumption, the LWR problem has a 'lossy mode': we can sample a matrixÃ which is computationally indistinguishable from a uniformly random A such that the tuple (Ã, Ã s p ) does not reveal too much information about the secret s.
Definition 3.1 (Lossy Sampler). Let χ = χ(λ) be an efficiently samplable distribution over Z q . We define an efficient lossy samplerÃ $ ← Lossy(1 n , 1 m , 1 , q, χ) via:
Although the matrixÃ computed by the Lossy algorithm is statistically far from a uniformly random matrix, it is easy to show that it is computationally indistinguishable from one under the LWE ,m,q,χ assumption, where the dimension of the secret is now instead of n. In particular, we can think of each column of C as an LWE secrets, the matrix B as the coefficients, and each column ofÃ as the corresponding LWE output. Therefore, the following lemma from [GKPV10] follows by a simple hybrid argument.
, and letÃ
Then, under the LWE ,m,q,χ assumption, the following two distributions are computationally indistinguishable:
We now prove the following lemma, which states that for appropriate parameters, the secret s maintains a high level of smooth min-entropy (see Definition 2.3) givenÃ and Ã · s p . The proof is sketched in Section 1.1, and the full derails are below.
Lemma 3.3. Let n, m, , p, γ be positive integers, χ be some β-bounded distribution (i.e., E[|χ|] ≤ β), and q ≥ 2βγnmp be a prime. Then the following holds:
(ii) (High-Entropy Secret) Let (s, aux) be correlated random variables with s ∈ [−γ, γ] n ⊆ Z n , and letÃ $ ← Lossy(1 n , 1 m , 1 , q, χ) be chosen independently. Then, for ε = 2 −λ + q − and any ε > 0 we have:
Both parts above also holds when q is not prime, as long as the largest prime divisor of q, denoted p max , satisfies GCD(q, q/p max ) = 1, p max ≥ 2βγnmp. In this case we get ε = (2 −λ + (p max ) − + Pr[s = 0 n mod p max ]).
Proof. We start by proving part (ii) of the Lemma, for a prime q. Recall that forÃ chosen via the Lossy function, we can writeÃ = BC + F as described above. Let us define the set I 
where (3) follow from the definition of a 'border', (4) follows by conditioning, (5) follows by Lemma 2.7 and the fact that b i , Cs is uniform over Z q , and (6) follows since each entry of s is bounded by γ in absolute value and each entry of f i is by expectation less than β in absolute value. Furthermore, the events i ∈ I are mutually independent since the above probabilities are over independent choices of b i , f i . Therefore, for a fixed C, s such that Cs = 0, we have E[|I|] ≤ 1 and, by Chernoff (Lemma 2.5), Pr[|I| ≥ λ] ≤ 2 −λ . Finally, taking into account the probability that
Since the bit-length of Z is |Z| = |I|(log(m) + log(p)) we have |Z| ≤ λ(log(m) + log(p)) with overwhelming probability. Therefore
where the second and third line follows by Lemma 2.4, and the last line follows since q ≥ mp. This proves part (ii) of the lemma for a prime q.
We now prove part (i) of the lemma for a prime q using the same techniques. Let us write s $ ← Z n q as a sum s = s 1 + s 2 where s 1
Then we can completely reconstructÃ, Ã s p given B, C, F, Cs 2 ,Ãs 1 , Z where Z = {(i, (Ãs) i p ) : i ∈ I}. We can prove that |I| ≤ λ with overwhelming probability the exact same way as for part (i) and therefore |Z| ≤ λ(log(m) + log(p)) w.o.p. This tells us that
This concludes the proof of part (i) of the lemma when q is prime.
Finally, it is easy to extend the analysis to a composite q as long as the largest prime factor p max of q is sufficiently large and relatively prime toq/p max . The only place in our analysis where we used that q is prime is in equation (5) to argue that, for any Cs = 0 and uniform
This gives us a modified version of equation (6):
m which is satisfied as long as p max ≥ 2βγnmp. Lastly, we now also need the modified bound:
The rest of the proof is exactly the same.
New "LWR from LWE" Reduction
In the following section we present the main result of this paper, namely sufficient conditions under which the LWR-assumption holds. As discussed in the introduction, the main difference to the work of Banerjee et al. [BPR12] is that our reduction works for a strictly larger range of parameters. In particular, in contrast to their result, our result does not require a super-polynomial modulus or modulus-to-error ratio, at least as long as the number of samples m that will be given out is known ahead of time. The proof of the theorem is sketched in Section 1.1, and the full details are given below.
Theorem 4.1. Let k, , n, m, p, γ be positive integers and q be a prime. Further, let χ be a β-bounded distribution for some real-valued β (all parameters are functions of λ) such that q ≥ 2βγnmp. Assuming that the LWE ,m,q,χ assumption holds:
log(q) log(2γ) + 2λ, then the LWR n,m,q,p -assumption holds. (ii) If k ≥ ( + λ + 1) log(q) + 2λ, then the weak and leaky LWR WL(γ,k) n,m,q,p -assumption holds.
For exact security, if the above LWE assumption is (t, ε)-secure and ≥ λ, then in both cases the corresponding LWR-problem is (t , ε )-secure, where t = t − poly(λ), ε = m(2 · nε + 3 · 2 −λ ) = poly(λ)(ε + 2 −λ ). Both parts of the above theorem also hold if q is not prime as long as the largest prime divisor of q, denoted p max , satisfies GCD(q, q/p max ) = 1, p max ≥ 2βγnmp. In this case we still get t = t − poly(λ), ε = poly(λ)(ε + 2 −λ ).
Proof. We will only prove part (i) of the theorem here using part (i) of Lemma 3.3. The proof of part (ii) of the theorem works in complete analogy using part (ii ) of the lemma.
Let us first prove the following: under the LWE ,m,q,χ assumption with the parameters as in the theorem, we have
where (s|Ã, Ã s p ) ≥ n log(2γ) − ( + λ) log(q) ≥ 2λ + log(q). Therefore, using the fact that inner product is a good (average-case) strong extractor, we have:
where u ← Z q is uniformly random and independent. The exact statistical distance is bounded by 2 · 2 −λ + q − . Finally, we can replace the lossyÃ with a uniformly random A to get:
Combining the above three hybrids proves (7).
To prove the statement of Theorem 4.1, we need to prove
where u $ ← Z m q . This follows by a simple sequence of hybrid arguments. Define the hybrid distribution H i = (A, h (i) p ) where the first i components of the vector h (i) are taken from As and the rest are chosen uniformly at random. Then H m = (A, As p ), H 0 = (A, u p ). Moreover, equation (7) immediately shows the indistinguishability of hybrids H i and H i+1 .
For exact security, assume that the underlying LWE assumption is (t, ε) secure. Notice that our argument consists of m hybrids in which we rely on equation (7). Furthermore, to prove (7) we relied on three sub-steps: the first and the third rely on Lemma 3.3, which itself consists of n hybrids using LWE, and the middle step using having statistical distance 2 · 2 −λ + q − . Therefore, the total distance is m(2nε + 2 · 2 −λ + q − ).
Remark on β-bounded distributions. In the theorem, we require that the distribution χ is β-bounded meaning that E[|χ|] ≤ β. A different definition, which also would have been sufficient for us, would be to require that Pr
The latter notion of boundedness is used in the work of Banerjee et al. [BPR12] . Although the two notions are technically incomparable (one does not imply the other) for natural distributions, such as the discrete Gaussian, it is easier to satisfy out notion. In particular, the discrete Gaussian distribution Ψ σ with standard deviation σ satisfies E[|Ψ σ |] ≤ σ but we can only get the weaker bound Pr
Therefore, we find it advantageous to work with our definition.
Remark on Parameters. Notice that in the above theorem, the parameter γ offers a tradeoff between the size of the modulus q and the secret vector length n: for a bigger γ we need a bigger modulus q but can allow smaller secret length n. The following corollary summarizes two extreme cases of small and large γ.
Corollary 4.2. Let Ψ σ denote a discrete Gaussian distribution over Z q with standard deviation σ, and assume that the LWE ,m,q,Ψσ -assumption holds. Then the LWR n,m,q,p -assumption holds in either of the following settings of parameters:
-(Minimize Modulus/Error Ratio.) If q ≥ 2σnmp is a prime, and n ≥ ( + λ + 1) log(q) + 2λ.
By setting p = O(1), we can get a modulus-to-error ratio as small as q/σ = O(m · n). -(Maximize Efficiency.) If q ≥ (2σnm) 3 is a prime, p = 3 √ q and n ≥ 3 + 5λ + 3.
The efficiency of LWR is now similar to the LWE assumption with n = O( ) and log(p) = O(log q).
Proof. The corollary follows directly from part (i) of Theorem 4.1. In part (i) we set γ = 1 and in part (ii) we set γ = p = 2σnm = 3 √ q. We also rely on the fact that the discrete Gaussian distribution satisfies E[|Ψ σ |] ≤ σ and is therefore σ-bounded.
Reusable Extractors
The notion of a 'computational reusable extractor' was defined by Dodis et al. [DKL09] . Intuitively, this is a tool that allows us to take some weak secret s that has a sufficient amount of entropy, and to use it to repeatedly extract fresh pseudorandomness Ext(s; a i ) using multiple public random seeds a i . Each extracted output should look random and independent. Equivalently, we can think of a reusable extractor as a weak PRF f s (·), which should be indistinguishable from a random function when evaluated on random inputs a i and remain secure even if the secret key s is not chosen uniformly at random, as long as it has entropy. The work of [DKL09] constructed such reusable extractors under a new assumption called "Learning Subspaces with Noise (LSN)". Reusable extractors were also implicitly constructed based on the DDH assumption in the work of Naor and Segev [NS09]. 9 Here we give a new construction based on the LWR problem, with a security reduction from the LWE assumption. Theorem 5.2. Let n, p, γ be integers, p be a prime, and define q = p · p . Then the function
is a (k, m)-reusable extractor assuming that the LWE ,m,q,χ assumption holds for some β-bounded distribution χ such that p > 2βγnmp and k ≥ ( + λ + 1) log(q) + 2λ. i is a reusable extractor if s ∈ Z n q , and the a ∈ G n for some DDH group of prime order q.
Notice that one nice property of the above reusable extractor is that it has a graceful degradation of security as the min-entropy k of the source drops. In particular, there is no hard threshold on the entropy k determined by the parameters that define the scheme: γ, n, q, p. Instead, as the entropy k drops we can still reduce security from a correspondingly less secure LWE assumption with smaller secret size . In other words, the scheme designer does not need to know the actual entropy k of the secret -but the scheme gets gradually less/more secure as the entropy of the secret shrinks/grows. A similar notion of graceful security degradation was noted in the work of Goldwasser et al.
[GKPV10].
Lossy Trapdoor Functions
Lossy trapdoor functions (LTDFs) [PW08, PW11] , are a family of functions f pk (·) keyed by some public key pk, which can be sampled in one of two indistinguishable modes: injective and lossy. In the injective mode the function f pk (·) is an injective function and we can even sample pk along with a secret trapdoor key sk that allows us to invert it efficiently. In the lossy mode, the function f pk (·) is "many-to-one" and f pk (s) statistically loses information about the input s. LTDFs have many amazing applications in cryptography, such as allowing us to output many hardcore bits, construct CCA-2 public-key encryption [PW11, MY10] , and deterministic encryption [FOR12] . In this section, we construct very simple and efficient LTDFs using the LWR problem, with security based on standard LWE. Our LTDF function is incredibly simple: the public key is a matrix pk = A and the function is defined as f A (s) = A · s p . As we will describe, one can sample an injective A with a trapdoor using the techniques of Ajtai [Ajt99] or subsequent improvements [AP11, MP12] , and one can sample a lossy A using the techniques we developed in Section 3. Although prior constructions of LTDFs from LWE are known [PW11, BKPW12] , our construction here has several advantages. Firstly, our scheme is extremely simple to describe and implement (we find it much simpler than the alternatives). Secondly, in contrast to both [PW08, BKPW12] , our lossy mode loses "almost all" of the information contained in s. In fact, the amount of "lossiness" in our LTDF construction is flexible and not determined by the parameters of the scheme itself. Even after we fix the parameters that allow us to sample the injective mode, we have an additional free parameter that allows us to make the lossy mode progressively more lossy under under a progressively stronger variant of the LWE assumption (this is similar to the "graceful security degradation" property of our reusable extractor).
We start by giving formal definitions of LTDFs and a more complex variant called "all-but-one lossy TDFs" (ABO-TDFs). Then, we construct both variants using the LWR problem.
Definitions of LTDFs
We now define lossy trapdoor function (LTDFs). Our notion differs somewhat from that of [PW11] in how we define the "lossy" property. Instead of requiring that, for a lossy pk, the range of f pk (·) is small, we require that very little entropy is lost from observing f pk (·). As far as we know, our version can be used interchangeably in all of the applications of LTDFs to date. As an example of how existing proofs can be extended to work with this new notion of lossiness we describe the necessary modifications to the proof of security for the CCA2 encryption scheme of [PW11] in Appendix A. To avoid confusion, we call our notion entropic LTDF (eLTDF).
Definition 6.1 (eLTDF). A family of l(λ)-entropic lossy trapdoor functions (eLTDF) with security parameter λ and domain D λ consists of a PPT sampling algorithms Gen and two deterministic polynomial-time algorithms F, F −1 such that:
Injective Functions: For any (pk, sk) in the support of Gen(1 λ , injective), any s ∈ D λ we require that F −1 (sk, F (pk, s)) = s. In particular, the function f pk (·) = F (pk, ·) is injective.
Lossy Functions: When pk $ ← Gen(1 λ , lossy), the function F (pk, ·) is lossy. In particular, for any mutually correlated random variables (s, aux) where the domain of s is D λ and for an independently sampled pk $ ← Gen(1 λ , lossy), we have: H smooth ∞ (s|pk, F (pk, s), aux) ≥ H smooth ∞ (s|aux) − l(λ). We call the parameter l = l(λ) the residual leakage of the LTDF. Indistinguishability: The distributions of pk as sampled by Gen(1 λ , injective) and Gen(1 λ , lossy) are computationally indistinguishable.
We also define a variant called an "all-but-one" trapdoor function (ABO-TDF) [PW11] . In this variant, the function F (pk, b, ·) also takes in a "branch" b in some (large) domain B . The sampling algorithm chooses (pk, sk) in such a way that there is a special branch b * for which F (pk, b * , ·) is lossy, but for all other b = b * , the function F (pk, b, ·) is injective. Furthermore, the value of the special branch b * is computationally hidden by the public key pk.
Definition 6.2 (eABO-TDF).
A family of l-entropic all-but-one trapdoor functions (eABO-TDF) with security parameter λ, branch collection B λ and domain D λ consists of a PPT algorithm Gen and two deterministic polynomial-time algorithms G, G −1 . For b * ∈ B λ , algorithm Gen(1 λ , b * ) outputs a function description pk and trapdoor sk such that the following holds. 
Construction of LTDFs
We now show how to construct eLTDFs from the LWR problem (assuming standard LWE).
Tools. As a tool in our construction, we will rely on the fact that we can sample a random LWE matrix A along with an inversion trapdoor that allows us to recover s, e given an LWE sample As + e where the error e is "sufficiently" short. The first example of such algorithms was given by Ajtai in [Ajt99], and was subsequently improved in [AP11]. More recently [MP12] significantly improved the efficiency of these results, by using a "qualitatively" different type of trapdoor. We describe the properties that we need abstractly, and can use any of the above algorithms in a black-box manner. In particular we need the following algorithms for some range of parameters (m, n, q, β):
GenTrap(1 n , 1 m , q): A PPT algorithm which on input positive integers n, q and sufficiently large m samples a matrix A ∈ Z m×n q and trapdoor T such that A is statistically close to uniform (in n log q). Invert(T, A, c): An algorithm which receives as input (A, T ) in the support of GenTrap(1 n , 1 m , q) and some value c ∈ Z m q such that c = As + e for some s ∈ Z n q and some error satisfying ||e|| 2 ≤ β. The algorithm outputs s. GenTrap(1 n , 1 m , q) and some value c ∈ Z m p such that c = As p for some s ∈ Z n q and outputs s.
LWRInvert(T, A, c) Takes as input (A, T ) in the support of
In particular [MP12] shows that there are algorithms (GenTrap, Invert) which work for n ≥ 1, q ≥ 2, sufficiently large m = O(n log q) and sufficiently small β < q/O( √ n log q). Since we can convert LWR samples As p into samples A · s + e for some reasonable short error ||e|| 2 ≤ √ mq/p, this also implies the following.
Lemma 6.3 (Trapdoors for LWR). There exist efficient (GenTrap, LWRInvert) as above for any n ≥ 1, q ≥ 2, sufficiently large m ≥ O(n log q) and p ≥ O( √ mn log q).
Proof. We can take an LWR sample A, c = As p and transforms it into an LWE sample A, As+e for some "short" e as follows:
Transform q (c): Takes as input c ∈ Z m p and outputs (q/p) · c ∈ Z m q .
It is easy to see that, if c = A · s p for some s, and q > p then:
where e ∈ (−1, 0] m and e ∈ (−q/p, 0] m . Therefore ||e|| ∞ ≤ q/p, and ||e|| 2 ≤ √ mq/p. As long as p ≥ O( √ mn log q) is sufficiently big, we have ||e|| 2 ≤ q/O( √ n log q) is sufficiently small so that
The Construction. We now describe our construction of eLTDFs based LWR. We will rely on the algorithms GenTrap and LWRInvert described above. We also rely on the lossy sampling algorithm Lossy and its properties developed in Section 3. The construction is parameterized by integers n, m, q, p (all functions of the security parameter λ). Furthermore, there will be two additional parameters and χ which are only needed by the lossy sampler. Lossy(1 n , 1 m , 1 , q, χ) . Output description pk = A. F (pk, s): On input s ∈ {0, 1} n and matrix pk = A ∈ Z m×n q output As p . F −1 (pk, c): On input c ∈ Z m p and t = (A, T ) output LWRInvert(T, A, c).
For the following theorem summarizes the properties of this construction.
Theorem 6.4. Let χ be an efficiently samplable β-bounded distribution and λ be the security parameter. For any positive integers n ≥ λ, sufficiently large m ≥ O(n log q), p ≥ O( √ mn log q) and a prime q ≥ 2βnmp, if the LWE ,m,q,χ assumption holds then the above construction is an l-LTDF with where l = ( + λ) log q.
Proof. Firstly, the correctness of inversion follows directly from Lemma 6.3.
Secondly, the indistinguishability property follows since: (1) in injective mode we set pk = A as the output of GenTrap which is statistically close to uniform, and (2) in lossy mode we set pk = A as the output of Lossy which is computationally indistinguishable from uniform by Lemma 3.2. Therefore, the two distributions are computationally indistinguishable.
Finally the second part Lemma 3.3 using γ = 1 directly implies the bound on the lossiness of the construction.
Construction of "All-But-One" Lossy Trapdoor Functions
We now show how to construct eABO-TDFs from the LWR problem. Our construction relies on the ideas of [ABB10] used to construct identity based encryption from LWE. It also bears some similarity to the identity-based lossy-trapdoor functions of [BKPW12] .
Technical Tools. As part of the construction we make use of the following full rank difference mappings for which we have adapted the definition of [ABB10].
Definition 7.1 (FRD Mapping). Let q positive integers. A collection of full rank difference (FRD) mappings is a sequence of functions H = {H n,q } with domain B n,q and range Z n×n q such that for all distinct x 0 , x 1 ∈ B n the matrix H(x 0 ) − H(x 1 ) ∈ Z n×n q has full rank. Moreover H n,q is computable in time polynomial in n log q.
A construction of an FRD mappings for prime q and any n is given in [CD09] with domain B n,q = Z n q . As a second tool, we also use the following lemma (similar to one in [ABB10]) which shows how to extend a trapdoor that allows us to solve LWE with some matrix A into a trapdoor that allows us to solve LWE for some larger matrix derived from A.
Lemma 7.2. For n ≥ 1, q ≥ 2, and sufficiently large m = O(n log q), p = O(m √ n log q) there exists PPT algorithms BigInvert and GenTrap such that for (A 1 , T )
Proof. We use the construction of [MP12] to instantiate GenTrap and Invert as described at the beginning of this section, and the algorithm Transform q described in the proof of Lemma 6.3. First, we describe algorithm BigInvert. where s := Gs and e := e 1 − Re 0 . To show that Invert(T, A 1 , c ) returnss = s (and so that G −1s = s) it suffices to upper-bound ||e || 2 such that the algorithms of [MP12] can be used for GenTrap and Invert. In particular by definition of R and p we see that ||e || ∞ ≤ (m + 1)(q/p) and therefore ||e || 2 ≤ √ m(m + 1)(q/p) < O(q/( √ n log q)) as required.
Construction. The following construction uses the algorithm Lossy, GenTrap and BigInvert described above. Moreover it is parameterized by integers n, m, q, , p and a distribution χ, all functions of security parameter λ. Finally the construction also makes use of an FRD collection H = H n,q with domain Z n q . Parameters: For security parameter λ define branch set B := Z n q and the domain D = Z n 2 .
Gen ( We summarize the properties of this construction in the following theorem.
Theorem 7.3. Let λ be a security parameter. Let , m, n, p be integers, q prime, β real (all functions of λ) such that n ≥ λ, the values m ≥ O(n log q), p ≥ O(m √ n log q) are sufficiently large and q ≥ 4βnm 2 p. Let χ be some distribution such that Pr
assuming that the LWE ,m,q,χ assumption holds, the above construction is an l-ABO TDF where l = ( + λ) log q.
Proof. Firstly, Lemma 7.2 immediately implies that the algorithm G −1 inverts c correctly when
Next, we show that, no matter what branch b * is chosen, the output of pk $ ← Gen(1 λ , b * ) is computationally indistinguishable from sampling three uniformly random and independent matrices A 0 , A 1 , A and setting pk = (A 0 , A 1 , A). Firstly, in the computation of Gen(1 λ , b * ), we can switch A 0 to being sampled uniformly at random instead of in its lossy mode, and this is indistinguishable by Lemma 3.2. Therefore, now A, A 0 are random and mutually independent. Secondly, we can view multiplication by A 0 as a strong extractor [DORS08] applied to R (think of each row of R as weak randomness, and the matrix A 0 as a seed), and therefore RA 0 is close to being uniform and independent of A and A 0 . Thus A 1 = RA 0 + AH(b * ) looks random and independent of A 0 and A. This proves the indistinguishability property of eABO-TDFs.
It remains to show that the residual leakage of the lossy branch is at most l. When evaluating
since the matrixĀ itself is not sampled from the lossy algorithm, we cannot use Lemma 3.3 in a black-box way. Instead, recall that we can write A 0 = BC + F where B, C are random and F ← χ m×n . Therefore we can writē
Secondly, we claim that RB is statistically close to being uniformly random and independent of B, RF. Here we again rely on the fact that matrix multiplication is a good extractor: we can think of RF as leaking n log(q) bits of information on each row of R, and RB as extracting n log(q) bits of information -therefore the statistical distance is negligible if m > 2n log(q) + O(λ). Therefore,Ā = B * C + F * has the almost the same distribution as an output of the lossy algorithm Lossy(1 n , 1 2m , 1 , q, χ) except that the distribution of F * is different. Nevertheless, we can bound each entry of F * by β * = mβ in absolute value with overwhelming probability. Since this was the only property that Lemma 3.3 relied on, we can apply its conclusions with m * = 2m and β * = mβ.
Deterministic Encryption
Deterministic public-key encryption [BBO07,BFOR08,BFO08,BS11,FOR12] is intended to guarantee security as long as the messages have sufficient entropy. Although there are blackbox constructions of deterministic encryption using LTDFs [BFO08] , here we present a very simple direct construction from the LWR problem. There are several definitions of deterministic encryption which can be proven equivalent; see [BFOR08, BFO08] . Here, we will use one such simple definition based on indistinguishability of encrypting messages from two different distributions.
Definition 8.1 (Deterministic Encryption). A deterministic encryption scheme with message length n = n(λ) consists of a PPT procedure (pk, sk) $ ← Gen(1 λ ) along with two deterministic polytime functions Enc, Dec. For correctness, we require that for all (pk, sk) in the support of Gen(1 λ ), all messages s ∈ {0, 1} n , we have Dec sk (Enc pk (s)) = s. We say that the scheme is secure for all k(λ)-sources if for any two distribution ensembles {S
λ } λ∈N over {0, 1} n(λ) which are efficiently sampleable in poly(λ)-times and have sufficient entropy
Construction. We give a very simple construction of deterministic encryption based on the LWR assumption. This construction is the same as one given by Xie et al. [XXZ12] , except for the setting of parameters. Whereas they required a super-polynomial modulus and modulus to error ratio by relying on variants of the analysis of [GKPV10,BPR12] we use our improved analysis from Section 4. We will rely on the LWR trapdoor generation and inversion algorithms GenTrap, LWRInvert described in Section 6.2 and Lemma 6.3. Our scheme is parameterized by some n, m, q, p, all functions of the security parameter λ, and has message length n.
(pk, sk)
Theorem 8.2. Let λ be the security parameter, n ≥ λ, , m, p be an integers, q be a prime, and χ be an efficiently samplable β-bounded distribution (all parameters are functions of λ) such that m ≥ O(n log q), p ≥ O( √ mn log q) are sufficiently large and q ≥ 2βnmp. If the LWE ,m,q,χ assumption holds then the above construction with parameters n, m, q, p is a deterministic encryptions secure for all k sources where k ≥ ( + Ω(λ)) log(q).
Proof. Correctness of decryption follows directly from Lemma 6.3. On the other hand, indistinguishability follows by part (ii) of Theorem 4.1. In particular, we chose our parameters such that the LWR WL(1,k) n,m,q,p assumption with weak (and leaky) secrets holds. This means that for any sources S (0)
where s 0
In particular, the first step follows by noting that GenTrap produces pk = A statistically close to uniform, the second step follows by LWR WL (1,k) n,m,q,p and the last two steps mimic the first two in reverse.
One big advantage of our scheme is that the parameters n, m, q, p do not determine the minimal entropy k. Instead for any k, we can prove security under a corresponding LWE assumption with dimension < k. This is similar to the property of our reusable extractors and LTDF, allowing for a graceful degradation of security as the entropy of the message decreases.
Conclusion
In summary, we give an improved security reduction showing the hardness of LWR under the LWE assumption for a wider setting of parameters. In doing so, we also show that the LWR problem has a "lossy mode". Together, these results lead to several interesting applications: security with weak/leaky secrets, reusable extractors, lossy trapdoor functions, and deterministic encryption. We conclude with several interesting open problems. Firstly, can we improve the reduction further and get rid of the dependence between the modulus q and the number of samples m? Secondly, can we use the techniques from this work to also improve the parameters of the "degree-k synthesizer" PRF construction of [BPR12] ? Lastly, can we use the techniques from this work to also get a reduction for Ring LWR from Ring LWE ? This does not seem to follow in a straight-forward manner.
where, in the first step, we think of aux = (pk F , c * 1 ) as auxiliary information. The rest of the proof is exactly the same.
B Robustness of LWE for Non-Uniform Secrets
As mentioned in the main part of this document, an analogue to Theorem 4.1 also holds for the LWE-assumption with weak and leaky keys, i.e., the case where the LWE-secret s is not drawn uniformly at random, but only from a high min-entropy distribution. This is formalized by the following definition:
Definition B.1 (LWE with Weak and Leaky Secrets). Let λ be the security parameter and n, m, q be integer parameters and χ be a distribution as in Definition 2.6. Let γ = γ(λ) ∈ (0, q/2) be an integer and k = k(λ) be a real. The LWE WL(γ,k)
n,m,q,χ problem says that for any efficiently samplable correlated random variables (s, aux), where the support of s is the integer interval [−γ, γ] n and H ∞ (s|aux) ≥ k, the following distributions are computationally indistinguishable: We will need the following lemma, which intuitively says that if two distributions are close, then with high probability a sample from the first distribution can also be used as a sample for the second distribution: Using this Lemma, we can prove the following proposition which states that samples from some distribution X can be deterministically turned into samples from another (unknown) distribution Y using some extra auxiliary information whose length depends on the statistical distance of X and Y . It remains to show that Z is short. Each such tuple contained in Z consists of (log m + t) bits of information. The expected number of such tuples is δ · m ≤ 1, and since the probabilities of i being in Z are independent, we can use the Chernoff bound (Lemma 2.5) to prove that the number of tuples in Z is greater than λ with probability only ≤ 2 −λ .
The following lemma shows that, whenÃ $ ← Lossy() is chosen via the lossy sampler than the LWE samplesÃ,Ã · s + e with some sufficiently large noise e do not reveal too much information about s. This is a direct analogue to Lemma 3.3, which showed the above property for LWR samples.
